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CHAPTER 4  
THE GUINEA–BISSAU CASE 
 
There is general agreement that the Third Wave of democratization began on April 25, 
1974 in Lisbon, Portugal with a military coup that overthrew the Salazar–Caetano 
authoritarian regime that had been installed since the late 1920s.1 The Third Wave has 
continued, with fits and starts, until today, 42 years later. In fact, the military coup of 
April 25, 1974 began in Guinea–Bissau in 1973 when the Soviet Union furnished the 
guerrilla movement, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde 
(PAIGC) with surface-to-air missiles, thereby denying air superiority to the Portuguese, 
who had been fighting the PAIGC since 1963. Despite efforts by the junior officers (and 
finally the Portuguese military commander, General António de Spínola, who knew that 
Portugal had lost Guinea–Bissau, and should negotiate independence there while 
retaining the incomparably more valuable settler colonies of Angola and Mozambique) to 
convince Premier Marcelo Caetano, the regime was intransigent. Consequently, the 
junior officers formed the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), and overthrew the regime on 
April 24, 1974. In the resulting turmoil Portugal underwent a revolution, losing not only 
Guinea–Bissau, but also Angola, Mozambique, and East Timor.2 
 Unfortunately, Guinea–Bissau has not participated in the Third Wave of 
democratization, or in the reforms of civil-military relations that have been part of the 
democratization process in most parts of the world.3 As stated in the  
“Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of 
the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau” (UNIOGBIS), 
United Nations Security Council January 19, 2015: “Since its independence in 1974, the 
country has never seen a Government complete its term in office. Coups d’etat took place 
in 1980, 1998-99, 2003, and 2012, attempted coups took place in 1985 and 1993, and 
alleged attempts took place in 2009, 2011 and 2012. The political instability in the 
country has been accompanied by repeated gross violations of human rights, including 
politically motivated assassinations, abductions, cases of torture, arbitrary arrests, 
detentions of political opponents and civil society representatives, and restrictions on the 
freedom of expression and assembly.”4 The coup in 1998 resulted in a civil war that 
lasted most of a year. During that conflict, what professional armed forces that remained 
from the independence movement against the Portuguese were replaced by armed gangs.5 
The lack of professional armed forces—and training facilities to help make them 
professional—continues until the present. The civil war also destroyed what 
infrastructure there was at the time, including the closing of the United States embassy 
which was shelled resulting in the death of a guard.  
The armed forces of Guinea–Bissau is, more than anything, a criminal enterprise. 
According to one analyst “Indeed narco–trafficking is not only the ‘core business’ of the 
Armed Forces in Guinea–Bissau, it is also, due to the financial weight of cocaine 
trafficking, the reason the military has assumed previously unimagined levels of 
importance.”6 To paraphrase the Grand Jury document for the United States District 
Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America v. Antonio Indjai, 
Defendant: In April 2010, Antonio Indjai, the defendant, helped lead a military coup 
which resulted in the detention of the Prime Minister.  
By June 2010, Indjai had become Chief of Staff of the Guinea–Bissau Armed 
Forces. On or about April 12, 2012, the military staged another coup. In the aftermath of 
the coup, the first public communiqué by the “Military Command” that took 
responsibility for the coup was issued by the Armed Forces General Staff, led by Antonio 
Indjai. He was a defendant, and pleaded guilty on four counts. The first was to engage in 
a narco-terrorism conspiracy with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 
The second was to import cocaine from Colombia and to oversee its distribution—
including in the United States. The third was to support the FARC, a terrorist 
organization, with arms, including SAM missiles. And the fourth was to acquire the SAM 
missiles ostensibly for the Guinea–Bissau Armed Forces that would be transferred to the 
FARC with the intention to shoot down US helicopters in Colombia.7 Later, in 2013, the 
chief of the Guinea–Bissau Navy was caught in a sting operation, involving drug 
trafficking, and pleaded guilty at the US District Court in Manhattan.8   
SOME POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION  
There is no single reason for the current sad situation in Guinea–Bissau.9 There are, 
instead, at least seven reasons that must be reviewed and analyzed with the goal to 
identify what might be changed so that the overall political situation, including the 
security forces, could be improved.  
 First, according to the single most thorough and authoritative study of Guinea–
Bissau, Professor Joshua Forrest claims that the Portuguese, in fighting the insurgents, 
including the PAIGC, engaged in what he terms “state terror” to retain the colony.10 
Having defeated the Portuguese, and taken control over the independent country, the 
PAIGC replicated the “state terror” and continued to use it after independence in 
September 1974.11 From the beginning, then, extreme violence became the common 
currency in politics, including, but not limited to, the armed forces and politics. Correia 
de Nóbrega also highlights the use of extreme violence in all that concerns the armed 
political party that led the country to independence, the PAIGC.    
 Second, Guinea–Bissau, unlike Angola and Mozambique, was not a settler 
colony. In contrast to these two colonies, Guinea–Bissau lacked the size, climate, and 
natural resources that could sustain a sizeable Portuguese settler population. 
Consequently, there was minimal investment in infrastructure and in human capital. 
Guinea–Bissau became independent with virtually nothing. For example, at independence 
only 2% of the population was literate.12 In short, Guinea–Bissau began life as an 
independent country with minimal assets. Politics, including violent politics, was a matter 
of attempting to capture the very limited resources that were available.  
 Third, Guinea–Bissau is among the bottom ten countries in the world in terms of 
economic and social development. Its only legal export crop is cashew nuts, virtually all 
of which go to India for processing. According to the United Nations Development 
Program’s Human Development Index, 2015, Guinea–Bissau is 178 out of 187 
countries.13 The misery and poverty are obvious in every imaginable respect. While there 
is a port in Bissau, it is in total disrepair, and even lacks cranes. There is an international 
airport at Bissau, but scheduled flights are few and far between. The Portuguese Airline 
TAP/Air Portugal, no longer provides service to Bissau. The country began its 
independent existence poor, and has remained poor.  
 Fourth, unlike other post–colonial countries, including Angola and Mozambique, 
Guinea–Bissau did not begin its independence with an acknowledged leader. The main 
leader of the independence movement, Amílcar Cabral, was assassinated, apparently by 
rivals within the PAIGC, in January 1973, before independence. Much of the “state 
terror” that Professor Forrest refers to, was caused by rival elements in the PAIGC 
fighting for power. There was no independence leader, such as an Agostino Neto (of 
Angola) let alone a figure of the stature of Nehru, who could lead the newly independent 
country. Not only was Amílcar Cabral murdered, but other, similar leaders from Cape 
Verde were also marginalized, and the two independent countries, Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde later went their separate ways.   
 Fifth, while the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP) of the PAIGC 
was, as noted above, riven by factions and all were prone to use violence to assert 
themselves, with the civil war of 1998-99 what little element of military professionalism 
there was disappeared completely. Whereas in 1990 there were 2, 500 personnel in the 
armed forces, today the estimated numbers are at least double. Further, they are 
extremely top–heavy.14 The armed forces are not professional. Indeed, there is no 
military academy, and there are absolutely no other training facilities for the armed 
forces. Based on the author’s experience at a seminar in Bissau the week of August 16, 
2015, a great many of the senior officers seem illiterate and unable to read or speak in 
Portuguese. They can converse only in creole. Guinea–Bissau lacked, and still lacks, a 
professional armed force.   
 Sixth, in view of the poverty of the country and the political instability, salaries 
and pensions for the armed forces are extremely problematic. We will see below that this 
fact may offer leverage for potential reform in civil–military relations. Everything very 
quickly becomes a matter of the use of force to obtain resources. In the meantime, 
however, there is a temptation for the military to engage in drug trafficking, and as we 
saw above—and will see even more below—this takes place at the highest levels of the 
armed forces. Even if they were not involved, the lack of resources, including boats, 
would make it impossible for the armed forces to control the archipelago of islands off 
Bissau.  
 Seventh, as stated in the UNIOGBIS Report: “At the root of the cycle of 
instability in Guinea-Bissau lies the fact that there has not been serious and genuine 
dialogue aimed at national reconciliation among the various stakeholders in the 
country.”15 The country’s political and military history since independence in September 
1974 demonstrates again and again the accuracy of this profound statement. The most 
recent analyses of Guinea–Bissau by virtually all observers highlight the lack of dialogue 
and resulting instability. In its report of February 12, 2016, UNIOGBIS, states the 
following on page 1 under “Major developments in Guinea-Bissau: “The political 
environment in Guinea-Bissau has continued to be marked by tensions and divisions 
within the ruling African Party of the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) 
and among the sovereign organs of the State.”16 And, in its most recent report, of August 
2, 2016, UNIOGBIS states: “Since my previous report, the political situation in Guinea–
Bissau has deteriorated.”17  
The International Crisis Group, in their Crisis Watch Database of February 1, 
2016 has a long paragraph detailing the factional struggle within the PAIGC; the fragility 
of political institutions; and the disruption and chaos in the political system.18 And, in 
Jeune Afrique, its article on February 11, 2016 was entitled “Guinée-Bissau: face à 
l’impasse politique, la communauté international exaspérée”19 The most recent 
UNIOGBIS Report, of August 2, 2016, provides chapter and verse on the political 
stalemate and the many efforts by other countries and international organizations to 
resolve the stalemate.20 In short, the domestic political actors, which clearly include the 
armed forces, are so far unwilling and maybe even unable to negotiate and find solutions 
which might lead to political stability, and in which the armed forces are not the central 
political actors.   
 On the basis of this political background, which of course extends back to even 
before independence in 1974, it is no surprise that Guinea–Bissau is extremely negative 
in terms of our assessment framework. In fact, it would be negative in terms of any 
assessment framework, as indeed virtually all of the articles about the country by social 
scientists are extremely negative. While the author of this chapter normally gives the 
highest priority in the analysis of politics to domestic factors, he found in the case of 
Portugal in the 1970s from coup, to revolution, and ultimately to democracy, there was a 
very important role for foreigners in politics, national defense & security, and the 
economy. Portugal did indeed lead the Third Wave, but events there were very heavily 
influenced by foreign states (especially Germany and the United States), NATO, the 
IMF, World Bank, and European Investment Bank.21  
In the current situation of Guinea–Bissau, the author believes that if there is to be 
any solution to the seriously unstable political and political–military situation, it will to 
some degree have to be externally influenced if not externally imposed. There are a huge 
number of external actors involved in Guinea-Bissau. This should not be surprising 
considering the country’s instability in a region where terrorism is making inroads; its 
role as a transit location for illegal drugs; the concerns of European countries regarding 
the implications of both instability and drugs; the aspirations of Portugal and Brazil 
regarding a Lusophone country; and the unscrupulous behavior of some military leaders 
who were prepared to provide SAMs to the FARC for money to be derived by selling 
cocaine.  
While there is a great deal of overlap, as one would expect in a small town such as 
Bissau, the author believes the main themes, or issues, to be described and analyzed are 
three. First (clearly a power issue), are the roles of the US Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
attempting to impede the use of Guinea–Bissau as a transit location for illegal drugs, 
mainly cocaine. Second is the role of neighbors (Brazil, across the South Atlantic) and 
Nigeria (mainly though ECOWAS) in attempting to bring political stability to Guinea–
Bissau. And third is the role of UNIOGBIS in attempting to coordinate the policy of the 
donor community for the progress and benefit of Guinea–Bissau.   
DRUGS   
There is an abundant literature on Guinea–Bissau as a drug transit state. Indeed, 
monograph titles capture the general sense. One is “Advancing Stability and 
Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State.”22 Another 
telling title is, “Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a Drug Trafficker’s Dream.”23 
Authors such as Eduardo Costa Dias go into great detail on the how, why, and 
implications of the transit of drugs through Guinea–Bissau.24 The journal Perspectives of 
the UNODC published a lead article entitled “Guinea-Bissau: New hub for cocaine-
trafficking.”25 And, most recently, the US Department of State, Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in their 2015 International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report state the following: “Guinea-Bissau is a transit hub for cocaine 
trafficking from South America to Europe. The country’s lack of law enforcement 
capabilities, demonstrated susceptibility to corruption, porous borders, and convenient 
location provide an opportune environment for traffickers. The complicity of government 
officials at all levels in this criminal activity inhibits a complete assessment and 
resolution of the problem. Despite a newly elected government that is seeking to establish 
the rule of law, Guinea-Bissau’s political system remains susceptible to and under the 
influence of narcotics traffickers.”26 
These facts are well known. What is most important is that something is being 
done about the involvement of the highest levels of government (including the armed 
forces) in the trafficking of illegal drugs. The US Drug Enforcement Administration has a 
regional office in Dakar, Senegal, which is responsible for Guinea–Bissau (as there is no 
United States embassy in Bissau). General Antonio Indjai, Chief of Staff of the Guinea–
Bissau Armed Forces was arrested in a West African country on April 4, 2013, and 
transferred to American custody, where he was subsequently indicted in New York for 
trafficking in cocaine owned by the FARC, with distribution planned for the United 
States, and plans to furnish the FARC with surface-to-air missiles which would be used 
to shoot down American helicopters.27 And, on April 2, 2013, in a sting operation, the 
DEA arrested the chief of the Guinea–Bissau Navy, José Américo bubo Na Tchuto for 
trafficking in cocaine. He was also transferred to New York and indicted.28 Both of these 
highest-level officers from the Guinea–Bissau armed forces are serving time in prisons in 
the United States. The arrests demonstrated that while these officers might enjoy 
impunity within Guinea–Bissau, the international community could reach out, extradite 
them, try them, and put them in prisons in the United States for a very long time. In the 
words of one of the author’s contacts in Bissau, the arrests demonstrated the vulnerability 
of the officers, and it really got their attention.29  
In short, while impunity might exist within Guinea-Bissau, it is strictly limited 
globally. In this regard, that of power, Guinea–Bissau is under a United Nations sanctions 
regime in which eleven designated individuals are under travel bans. The United Nations 
document states the following: “…the impact of sanctions in Guinea-Bissau has 
transcended the travel ban restrictions imposed by resolution 2048 (2012)…sanctions had 
acted as a deterrent to the direct involvement of the security and defence forces in the 
political crisis the country had faced since August 2015.”30  
SUPPORT BY REGIONAL POWERS 
Even discounting for exaggerated rhetoric, the regional power, Brazil, in the South 
Atlantic, has been active in supporting democracy and democratic civil–military relations 
in Guinea–Bissau. This includes initiatives at the level of the United Nations and also 
within the country.31 Probably most important for the purposes of this chapter are those 
concerning education and training for the police and the armed forces. The Brazilian 
Federal Police created the Centro de Treinamento de Forças de Segurança and the 
Brazilian military, began a Centro de Formação de Oficiais, for the Guinea–Bissau 
Armed Forces. However, with the military coup of 2012 work on this center was halted.32 
 With the support of Portugal, elements in the military have now migrated into two 
new police organizations, roughly based on the models in Portugal of the Guarda 
Nacional Republicana and the Pólicia de Segurança Pública. In Guinea-Bissau these are 
the Guarda Nacional and the Pólicia de Ordem Pública. These two major police forces 
have been recently created, they total 4,758 officers and men, but so far their tasks or 
functions have not been delineated nor has professional training been provided. They are 
formally under the Ministry of the Interior, and not Defense.33 
At the regional level, ECOWAS, and in particular Nigeria, have been very active. 
ECOWAS has been involved in attempting to build peace in Guinea–Bissau since at least 
1998.34 At an Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS on September 12, 2015 the Authority 
of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS extended the mandate of its Mission in 
Guinea-Bissau (ECOMID) through June 2016. They also mandated the presidents of 
Senegal and Guinea, in their respective capacities as ECOWAS Chair and ECOWAS 
Mediator for Guinea–Bissau (with the assistance of the former president of Nigeria, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, in his capacity as Special Envoy of the President of Nigeria) to 
facilitate dialogue with all stakeholders to find a lasting solution to the political crisis.  
Former President Obasanjo returned to Bissau in October 2015 to pursue consultations 
with political stakeholders. ECOWAS, the UN, African Union, EU, and the Comunidade 
dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) were heavily involved in negotiations between 
President Vaz and the government in February of 2016. ECOWAS—with the support of 
the EU, Nigerian troops—continues to maintain a presence in Guinea–Bissau.  
SUPPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
International donors include individual countries such as East Timor, France, Great 
Britain, Portugal, and the United States, as well as a myriad of international organizations 
including the EU, UNICEF, UNDP, CPLP, the World Bank, International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, the Peace-building Fund, the African Development Bank, and 
the West African Development Bank. In March 2015, at an international partners’ round-
table, pledges were made for approximately $1.3 Billion. In an effort to coordinate 
programs and policies, the United Nations established in Guinea–Bissau a UN Peace-
building Support Office on March 3, 1999. On January 1, 2010 it was replaced by the UN 
Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS. Since that time, its 
mandate has been extended every year.35 As Guinea–Bissau stumbles from crisis to crisis, 
the UNIOGBIS continues until today, but little of the pledged $1.3 billion has been 
released.36  
In addition to informing the UN and other sponsors, the UNIOGBIS has as its 
main task the implementation of several key elements in terms of a mandate. In the most 
recent report of the Secretary-General, dated February 12, 2016, they review the status of 
these ten elements. A review of this report will provide substantial information on the 
status of developments. They are as follows:   
A. Inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process. Some, but 
fairly modest progress.   
B. Strategic and technical advice and support for national authorities in 
implementing the national security sector reform and rule of law strategies. Again, some 
progress, but little progress on demobilization efforts and on pensioning off excess 
military personnel.  
C. United Nations good offices. Several meetings and ongoing tensions among 
state institutions and the PAIGC.   
D. Support for the Government of Guinea–Bissau in the mobilization, 
harmonization and coordination of international assistance. Several meetings to establish 
effective mechanisms for aid coordination.  
E. Strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing the capacity of State 
organs to function effectively and constitutionally. Numerous seminars and meetings.  
F. Strategic and technical advice and support for the establishment of effective 
and efficient law enforcement, criminal justice, and penitentiary systems. Again, 
numerous meetings and training sessions.  
G. Promotion and protection of human rights and human rights monitoring and 
reporting activities. Some progress, but “[D]espite intense lobbying by UNIOGBIS, 
efforts to review the status of the country’s National Human Rights Commission to make 
it compliant with the Paris Principles have been delayed.”37   
H. Strategic and technical advice and support for the Government of Guinea–
Bissau to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. Again, several 
meetings and training sessions.  
I. Incorporating a gender perspective into peace-building, in line with UN 
Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). More meetings and training 
sessions.  
J. Work with the Peace-building Commission in support of Guinea-Bissau’s 
peace-building priorities. One meeting.  
Finally, under “Observations,” the result of progress on these mandates is 
summed up in the following terms: “The political crisis within the main political party, 
PAIGC, and among the political leadership in Guinea-Bissau, which has prevented the 
country from moving forward with its national reform agenda for more than six months, 
is concerning. The current stagnation undermines the bright outlook for the country 
following the successful partner’s round table in March, during which international 
partners expressed unprecedented support for the country’s strategic and operational plan 
for the period 2015-2020. The crisis has the potential to further damage the already 
fragile State institutions and the overall peace-building process.”38   
ASSESSMENT 
National Brand. Given the extremely low degree of readiness, the country’s armed forces 
are incapable of defending its borders (although there is some deterrent effect from 
simply having armed forces). The conduct of international peacekeeping operations, 
which require specialized skills and a high level of professionalism, would seem to be far 
in the future. By virtue of the military’s central role in trafficking drugs, Guinea–Bissau 
is certainly a Troublemaker country. If the armed forces were better organized and more 
professional, it might be possible for the government to use them for a variety of public 
purposes, including law enforcement.     
Most Significant Threats. There are traditional threats at the borders with Guinea–
Conakry and Senegal, both of which have intervened in Guinea–Bissau. There is 
currently concern with Jihadist movements from the West Africa region, and particularly 
Mali. Guinea–Bissau is extremely vulnerable to smuggling activities. The country’s 
geography, characterized by remote islands and rivers, has turned Guinea–Bissau into a 
regional hub for illegal trafficking. 
Roles of the Security Forces. There is no formal delineation of roles (and the resources 
that go with them) for security force institutions. The embryonic police institutions 
complicate rather than complement the activities of the armed forces. Indeed, the clear 
articulation of roles for all security force institutions should form the first phase of 
security sector reform.  
Political System. Guinea–Bissau’s political development is too nascent for strict labeling, 
but the country has yet to form institutions worthy of the name. It is not a Collapsed State 
in the same sense as Libya or Somalia, but it has a lot of work to do. Chronic political 
instability has deprived Guinea–Bissau of strong leadership for long enough periods to 
make a difference.  
Contribution of the Security Forces to Good Governance. The security forces of Guinea–
Bissau contribute nothing to good governance but quite a lot to bad governance. Without 
serious and major reform of its security forces (armed forces, law enforcement, and 
intelligence), the country will fail to achieve gains in human security and good 
governance overall. 
Trends for Security Sector Institutions  
In a September 2016 seminar in Bissau, the CCMR faculty utilized the Level Two 
Assessment Framework, introduced in Chapter 2, as a teaching tool with the 50+ 
participants. The mean ratings for governability and effectiveness were 5.0 and 4.7 
respectively. Two police forces have just been founded, but their roles have yet to be 
delineated with each other, let alone from the military. While the police forces are 
ostensibly under the Ministry of Interior, they retain a military training profile and 
mentality.39 
Guinea–Bissau is widely considered a failed state in that no president has ever 
completed his term of office, and political paralysis is more the rule than the exception. 
So far, however, in the ongoing political crisis, the most positive observation in the 
February 2016 UNIOGBIS Report—and which still holds—is as follows: “I note with 
satisfaction that the armed forces have remained in their barracks and have not interfered 
in the political affairs of the country.”40  
The armed forces and the PAIGC were forged in a conflict where there was little 
distinction between the party and the military. Today, with some rudimentary elements of 
professionalism, the military may become separate from the government. So far, there is 
little good governance in any aspect of Guinea–Bissau, including security. In short, all 
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